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Abstract  
We explore issues of measurement for technology upgrading of the economies moving from middle 
to high-income status. In exploring this issue, we apply theoretically relevant and empirically 
grounded middle level conceptual and statistical framework based on three dimensions: (i) Intensity 
(ii) breadth of technological upgrading, and (iii) technology and knowledge exchange. As an 
outcome, we construct a three-pronged composite indicator of technology upgrading based on 35 
indicators which reflect different drivers and patterns of technology upgrading of countries at 
different income levels. We show that technology upgrading of middle-income economies is 
distinctively different from that of low and high-income economies. Our results suggest the 
existence of middle-income trap in technology upgrading – i.e. countries’ technology upgrading 
activities are not reflected in their income levels. Based on the simple statistical analysis we show 
that the middle-income trap is present in all three aspects of technology upgrading, but their 
importance varies across different aspects. A trap seems to be higher for ‘breadth’ of technology 
upgrading than for ‘intensity’ of technology upgrading and is by far the highest for the dimension of 
knowledge and technology interaction with the global economy. Finally, our research shows that 
technology upgrading is a multidimensional process and that it would be methodologically wrong to 
aim for an aggregate index.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Technology upgrading is a multidimensional process and the existing indicators, which are overly 
R&D oriented, do not capture this multidimensionality. In particular, the existing indicators do not 
reflect specificities of technology upgrading of middle-income economies. They are either 
atheoretical or not rooted in stylised facts of technology upgrading and thus not relevant for 
low/middle-income economies. Radosevic and Yoruk (2016a) have developed empirically grounded 
middle-level conceptual framework which could illuminate type of challenges that are pertinent to a 
significant number of middle income and ‘lower’ high-income economies (from $1000 - $30000 GNI 
pc) in their path out of the broadly defined middle-income trap. In this paper, we apply this new 
framework and explore its robustness and validity to a sample of 42 economies of different income 
levels.  
There is a variety of proposed composite indicators that measure countries’ performance in growth, 
competitiveness and innovation. Examples are: the Global Competitiveness Index (GCR, 2015), the 
Knowledge Economy Index  of the World Bank (Chen and Dahlman, 2004; Chen and Dahlman, 2005), 
the World Competitiveness Report Index (WCY, 2016), index of technological capabilities (ArCo) 
(Archibugi and Coco, 2004, 2005; Archibugi et al., 2009), the UNIDO Industrial Performance 
Scoreboard (UNIDO 2002; Lall and Albaladejo, 2002), Global Innovation Index, 1European Innovation 
Scoreboard2, the Technological Achievement Index of the UNDP (Desai et al., 2002), and the S&T 
Capacity Index (STCI) proposed by the RAND Corporation3, the High-Tech Indicators (HTI) developed 
at the Georgia Tech Technology Policy and Assessment Center 4.  
 
However, this diversity of indexes has not led to a diversity of measurement outcomes. The 
similarity in ranking across different indexes are striking (Nasierowski and Arcelus, 2000). They all 
point to the importance of innovation to economic development, but differences in their conceptual 
perspectives do not change significantly ranking among countries. On the other hand, Archibugi et 
al. (2009) show that single indicator like R&D can not substitute differences in ranking. So, despite 
similarities in rankings, the conceptual differences do matter. Based on these insights, we do not see 
the primary value of our contribution in a new ranking but in pointing to differentiated drivers of 
growth and technology upgrading at different income levels. This Schumpeterian approach is in 
intention similar to the WEF Global Competitiveness Index, which takes a differentiated view on the 
                                                          
1 https://www.globalinnovationindex.org/ 
2 http://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/innovation/facts-figures/scoreboards_en 
3 http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph_reports/2005/MR1357.0.pdf 
4 https://tpac.gatech.edu/sites/default/files/projectfiles/HTI_S_2008report_Jun10.pdf 
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role of technology across development path assuming that the closer countries are towards 
technology frontier, the more rest their growth and competitiveness on knowledge and 
technological activities. Our aim is not to focus on rankings per se but different drivers of technology 
upgrading. The learning effect should be in showing the diversity of drivers and compare countries 
regarding their upgrading paths. The ranking makes sense when comparing countries that are driven 
by similar drivers of technology upgrading or are at very similar stages of technology upgrading 
process.  
 
We approach technology upgrading as a multidimensional conceptual framework which goes 
beyond R&D in explaining the building of technology capabilities, which accompanies long-term 
growth. This concept is open to sensitivities of different levels of development and is empirically 
informed but also has some theoretical relevance. We consider it as an appreciative theorising 
framework, which aims to overcome a frequent weakness of composite indicators which is that they 
represent “measurement without theory” (Koopmans, 1947).  
Our results show the relevance of three-pronged approach to technology upgrading as the process 
driven by the intensity and breadth of technology upgrading, which are complemented by the 
degree and differences in modes of technology and knowledge exchange with the global economy. 
Although statistically, it is possible to unite three dimensions of technology upgrading into a single 
index we remain sceptical regarding policy usefulness of such exercise. We show the positive 
relationship between three dimensions of technology upgrading and levels of income, but also the 
non-linear relationship between levels of individual indexes (dimensions) and levels of income. We 
identify middle-income trap in technology upgrading and through simple OLS, we quantify its weight 
across different dimensions of technology upgrading.  
First, we explain in Section 2 the relationship between technology upgrading and technology gap 
literature. In Section 3 we explain the conceptual framework that lies behind the concept of 
technology upgrading. In Section 4, we describe individual indicators as well as applied method for 
constructing a three-pronged composite indicator of technology upgrading. In Section 5 we explore 
key stylised facts that emerge from the use of dataset that falls within our conceptual framework. In 
Section 6, we discuss the relevance of results and conclude.  
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2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING AND TECHNOLOGY GAP 
LITERATURE5 
 
Similar to the literature on ‘technology gap’ our paper addresses the issue of accumulation 
of technological capabilities. For example in similar fashion to Fagerberg (1987), we show 
that there is a close relationship between a country’s economic and technological levels of 
development.  However, we are primarily concerned with the accumulation of technology 
itself and we do not aim to explore determinants of growth but we recognise that the 
nature of technology accumulation changes as countries grow. Similar to very recent work 
in ‘technology gap’ literature (Castellaci, 2011) we show that the interaction among 
different dimensions of technology is a crucial factor in technology upgrading.  
 Technology gap literature assumes linear or log-linear relationship between technology 
variables and growth and postulates relationship across all income levels without exploring 
inflection points or threshold or middle trap levels (Fagerberg and Verspagen, 2002). 
However, we show that this relationship is not linear as we demonstrate the existence of 
middle income trap and show how that trap varies across three dimensions of technology 
upgrading.  We show that three drivers of technology upgrading are qualitatively different.  
 
Technology gap literature’s ambition to explain determinants of growth has its price in 
several stark simplifications. First, innovation is highly varied at different income levels. In 
some specifications (Castellacci, 2011) innovation is equated solely with patents and 
scientific papers which we consider quite problematic, since this has implications for use in 
developing countries that we study. Second, the potential for diffusion (a possible source of 
convergence, proxied by the level of productivity or GDP per capita) is not directly measured 
but is proxied by the outcome variable – i.e. levels of productivity. This assumption implies 
automatic convergence which is quite different from the idea of middle-income trap. Third, 
in these models interaction with the global economy is ignored or is proxied through 
openness which in itself is highly problematic variable and endogenous to growth. 
Technology gap literature uses the notion of absorptive capacity which is vague and is 
reduced on human capital and infrastructure.  
                                                          
5 We are thankful to the anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to the intricate links among the 
concepts of technology gap, technological capabilities and technology upgrading. 
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On the other hand, the drawback of our approach is that we are not yet able to run 
regression models as we do not yet have enough long run series for meaningful testing of 
dynamics of relationships between growth and technology upgrading factors. 
 
3. A FRAMEWORK FOR MEASURING TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING: A CONCEPTUAL 
APPROACH 
We conceptualise technology upgrading as a three-dimensional process which consists of:  
(i) Technology upgrading as depicted by intensity of production, R&D and technology 
generation activities,  
(ii) Breadth of technology upgrading, which is about diversity of technological knowledge, 
types of supporting infrastructure and organisational capabilities of firms which are the 
main carriers of technology upgrading, and  
(iii) Knowledge inflows and outflows in and out of the economy through a variety of forms 
such as trade, FDI and disembodied knowledge flows.  
All of the three dimensions have a strong grounding in the respective literature on firm-level 
technology upgrading, on structural change and growth, and on the integration of the global 
economy (see Radosevic and Yoruk, 2016a for overview and argument). 
Technology upgrading is an outcome of the interaction between intensification of different types of 
technology activities (dimension I), structural factors and changes in this process (dimension II) 
which are mediated by the way economy interacts in this process with the global economy 
(dimension III). Given its three-dimensional nature the aggregate indicator of technology upgrading 
can be calculated statistically but as we show later on it is not justified conceptually and policy-wise.  
Especially, a third dimension (interaction with global economy) is a complementary dimension, i.e. it 
amplifies or reduces effects of technology upgrading depending on modes of integration or 
interaction with the global economy. 
 
3.1. INTENSITY OF TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING BY TYPES (SCALE) 
This dimension of upgrading is about acquiring different kinds of technology capabilities, which are 
also a reflection of the various technological levels of economies. Economies that operate behind 
technology frontier are more likely to grow based on production capability, not technology capability 
while high-income economies are more likely to grow based on technology frontier (technology 
capability and R&D) activities.  
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Three types of capabilities (production capability, technology capability, R&D and knowledge 
intensity) are present in all economies to different degrees. Their importance as drivers of growth 
varies in dependence of achieved income and technology levels as well as of the structural features 
of economies.  
3.1.1. PRODUCTION CAPABILITY 
Production capability is the capability to produce with given level of technology at world levels of 
efficiency or productivity. It is different from technology capability and it requires primarily excellent 
operational efficiency (Bell and Pavitt, 1993). The key workforce to operational efficiency is skilled 
technicians or blue-collar workers.  A more complex capability is product and process engineering, 
which involves improvement in existing products and processes.  This ability is widely dependent on 
skilled engineers. Process and product engineering are still part of production capability as they are 
about incremental innovations, not changes in designs but improvements in products and processes.  
 
We use as proxies for production capability ISO9901 certificates, trademark applications and 
assessment on the job training activities. ISO certificates are universal management standard, which 
indicates that there are in place businesses process which should guarantee operational efficiency 
though not necessarily its improvements. However, ISO adopters have far lower organisational 
death rates than matched firms within their industries, their sales and employment grew 
substantially more rapid post certification than at matched firms (Levine and Toffel, 2009).  With the 
globalisation, they have spread as an internal mechanism of quality control and as a precondition for 
participating in global value chains (Stevenson and Barnes, 2001). They are also proxy for a variety of 
industry-specific standards which are difficult to aggregate. Terlakk and King  (2006) show that they 
provide a way of communicating about unobservable firm attributes, thereby generating a growth 
effect for certified organisations.   
 
Trademark applications are proxy for developed production capability but in the service sectors. 
They also proxy for marketing innovation and thus suggest that firm has differentiated production 
capability or brand (Millot, 2009; Mendonca et al., 2004). Baroncelli et al. (2004) et al. argue that the 
global distribution of trademarks is skewed toward high-income industrial countries and that they 
are concentrated in R&D-intensive sectors such as pharmaceuticals, scientific equipment, and the 
chemical industry. Finally, on the job training is proxy for human capital capacity to work effectively 
with the given technology. It captures both in-firm training and specialised high quality professional 
training outside the companies.   
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3.1.2. TECHNOLOGY CAPABILITY 
A developed technological capability indicates a capacity to change product and processes 
significantly through the systematic innovation process. There is not a sharp boundary between R&D 
and technology capability, but we can assume that technology capability is about development, not 
necessarily about research. The first stage of development is advanced development or prototype 
for manufacture which should be distinguished from exploratory development, which is about 
prototype in a system (Amsden and Tschang, 2003). There is a critical threshold level of capability 
required of firms to move from advanced development, which is development for manufacture to 
own design manufacture. Production capability, process and product engineering, and advanced 
development are doable within OEM enterprises while exploratory development is a feature of own 
design manufacturers (ODM).  
 
The available proxies of development activities are resident and international patents and industrial 
designs. They are the right proxies because they are about development, but equally, patents have 
well-known biases (van Zeebroeck, 2011). A significant advantage of using patents is the length and 
consistency of time series derived as well as the possibility to identify technological fields or 
specialisations using the patent classification. Also, as countries move up towards technology 
frontier patenting becomes more necessary and is less relevant for countries behind technology 
frontier where IPRs are not the major form of protection of technological know-how. To capture 
domestic technological activities pushing the technology frontier we rely on EPO and USPTO data, 
which reflect technological activities relevant for competitiveness in international markets. To 
capture technological capability for technological development behind the technology frontier we 
use direct patent applications by residents to their respective national patent offices. In general 
terms (even though the patent strategies may differ from this rule) residents will directly apply for 
patents in their home countries disregarding applications abroad if their technological activities do 
not have global industrial relevance. So, the resident direct patent applications to national patent 
offices dominantly proxy technology effort behind the technology frontier. Countries that are behind 
technology frontier should have much higher share of resident patents, and their share of 
transnational patents is marginal. However,  as countries move towards technology frontier their 
transnational patenting increases. This pattern may be somewhat different in very large catching up 
economies, where domestic patenting may continue to play an important role. However, their 
transnational patenting as a proxy for world frontier technology effort should continue to increase.6 
                                                          
6 For example, Hu and Jefferson (2009) show that it is the level of technological development that ultimately 
carries the strongest weight in patenting which is very much along the lines that we use patent proxies. 
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We use both EPO and USPTO data due to a geographic bias of patents. We do not use ‘international’ 
patents filed under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT), or applications filed simultaneously at 
several national offices (e.g., the ‘triadic families’) as these are biased towards inventions of higher 
value, which are often owned by large firms. This would underestimate patenting of countries at 
lower income levels that do not have many big companies (van Zeebroeck, 2011).  
3.1.3. RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT  
 
R&D is usually considered as the major component of innovation and, therefore, one of the major 
drivers of growth. This model is the basis of new (endogenous) growth theory (Romer, 1990; Lucas, 
1988). OECD (2003) landmark study shows that there is a clear positive linkage between private 
sector R&D intensity and growth in the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) for OECD 
economies. However, there is no clear-cut relationship between public R&D activities and growth, at 
least in the short term (ibid).  
 
Research and development are usually treated as one category though this seems to be mainly due 
to statistical convention rather than a belief that research and development are indeed similar 
categories. Amsden and Tschang (20003) show that the Frascati definitions are not specific enough 
to allow an R&D project to be classified accurately by conventional type (basic, applied and 
development). Under technological capability, we capture patents as they have intended 
commercial application. However, R&D has far broader aims and its links to growth and productivity 
is far from straightforward. Literature conventionally accepts that R&D has two faces (Cohen and 
Levinthal, 1989). One is as being the driver of world frontier innovation, and another one is R&D as a 
driving force for imitation activities or as a factor of absorptive capacity. On that basis, it is assumed 
that R&D is driver only of world frontier innovation but an only factor of absorptive capacity in 
industries that operate behind technology frontier. Griffith et al. (2004) on the example of twelve 
OECD countries find R&D to be statistically and economically significant in both technological catch-
up and innovation. Kneller and Stevens (2006) find opposite also on the example of twelve OECD 
countries and conclude that the effect of R&D on production is primarily through its contribution to 
the stock of Frontier knowledge itself in each industry.  
 
                                                          
However, Hu and Jefferson (2009) ignore the significant difference between external (transnational) 
applications from domestic applications by residents which forms important distinction in our case and is very 
important in the case of China (see  Holmes, McGrattan and Prescott (2015) and middle income economies, in 
general. 
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R&D plays a different role in economies at various levels of development. For example, middle-
income economies tend to grow more on imitation activities while transition towards high-income 
group requires a shift towards frontier technology activities. So, in both groups, R&D plays an 
important but different role. In catching-up economies, R&D has a much more important role in 
terms of absorptive capacity or capacity to use effectively knowledge from abroad in addition to its 
role as a driver of world frontier innovation. In catching-up EU economies, technology transfer 
activities are important drivers of innovation along with the non-R&D-based innovation activities. 
Reinstaller and Unterlass (2010) show using CIS micro-data for 17 EU countries that the 
determinants of successful product innovation of European innovative firms vary across countries 
depending on how far they are from the technological frontier. Farther away from the technological 
frontier, technology transfer is more important than own R&D; close to the frontier the cooperation 
with universities, own research, highly skilled personnel and intellectual property rights are 
paramount (ibid). However, Yoruk (2011) and Yoruk and Yoruk (2012) show that technology transfer 
and own R&D (even with imitative aims) are complementary and as their level increase in firms in 
the country away from the technology frontier, both the number and degree of knowledge networks 
increase.  
Given this evidence, the mainstream model of R&D based growth like Crépon, Duguet and Mairesse 
(1998) or CDM model, which establishes the link between R&D, innovation and productivity is 
theoretically grounded but does not capture non-R&D drivers of growth, which are quite important 
in catching-up economies. R&D remains relevant in the catching-up economies, but its role as the 
factor of absorptive capacity is much more prevalent when compared to its capacity as a driver of 
world frontier innovation. This is the main reason why we have to separate technological capability 
from R&D, which has a much broader role in economic development. 
We proxy R&D through the following indicators, both ‘hard’ and subjective: Business Enterprise 
Sector expenditures as % of GDP; Research and development expenditure (% of GDP); Researchers in 
R&D (per million people); Technicians in R&D (per million people); Science Publications: Scientific 
and technical journal articles; Science citations; and subjective assessment of Quality of scientific 
research institutions; and of University - Industry Collaboration. 
It is important to bear in mind that that production, technology and R&D capability are not 
hierarchically structured, i.e. moving from technology capability to R&D or from development to 
research does necessarily involve higher technology complexity but merely qualitatively different set 
of technology or knowledge requirements. Equally, if not more important, upgrading to ’higher’ 
stages are not automatically more rewarding regarding value added, i.e. upgrading may not 
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necessarily lead to increased incomes but can simply be necessary to maintain the existing levels of 
income.  
 
3.2. BREADTH OF TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING: STRUCTURAL CHANGE, INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
FIRMS’ STRUCTURE (SCOPE) 
 
Technology upgrading is about changes in technology intensity but equally about structural change. 
In fact, these two are inextricably linked. The process of technology upgrading is a process of 
diversification of technological knowledge, of increased organisational diversity and specialisation. 
Technology diversification is an expansion of technology base into a broader range of technology 
areas. 
3.2.1. INFRASTRUCTURE: HUMAN CAPITAL, PHYSICAL AND ORGANISATIONAL  
Technology upgrading is primarily taking place in firms, but it is not only firm-level business. The 
accumulation of technology capability in companies must be accompanied by an organisational and 
institutional infrastructure that supports the acquisition of such capabilities. Choung et al. (2014) 
show that transition from the adoption (catching-up) to the creation stage (post-catch-up) depends 
on the range of infrastructures that support innovation in a country, in addition to the strategy and 
resources of a single company. We consider infrastructure to be a major dimension of structural 
change. Infrastructure upgrading is essential element or externality of technology upgrading. 
Inefficiencies in infrastructure can hinder otherwise competitive firms to upgrade. 
Human capital can also be considered a very specific type of ‘infrastructure’ or precondition for 
technology upgrading. Technology embodied in new machinery and equipment will not by itself lead 
to increased productivity unless there are human skills to use effectively and improve it. Also, to be 
effective human skills need to be part of a specific organisational and economic process that rewards 
dexterity, learning and innovation (Lazonick, 2002). So, human skills unless converted into firm-
specific skills will not suffice for technology upgrading. Still, a human capital acquired through 
education can be considered an infrastructural precondition or input into technology upgrading.  
Another structural precondition for technology upgrading is physical infrastructure. Infrastructure 
generates significant externalities to firms’ transaction costs. It is both public good and input in the 
production of other intermediate inputs. Access to infrastructure services strongly correlates with a 
country’s average income (Griibler, 1990). As countries reach certain stages of economic 
development the extent to which infrastructure may represent binding constraint to their 
development changes. Thirty out of 32 studies of OECD countries found a positive effect of 
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infrastructure on some combination of output, efficiency, productivity, private investment and 
employment (Romp and de Haan, 2005).  
This dimension of technology upgrading is proxied by human capital indicators (average years of 
schooling of those over 25y age, subjective assessment of the quality of maths and science 
education, of availability of research and training services, of availability of scientists and engineers. 
Physical infrastructure is proxied by fixed broadband Internet subscribers (per 100 people) and by 
Gross Fixed Investment as % of GDP. 
3.2.2. STRUCTURAL CHANGES: TECHNOLOGY DIVERSIFICATION, CHANGES IN THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY 
OF INNOVATION   
There is not a general theory of structural change but a variety of theoretical approaches to different 
methodological nature that aim to explain structural shifts between three broad sectors and among 
industries within these sectors (Krueger, 2008). There is a common understanding that technological 
changes affect structural change in the way that industries with relatively lower rates of productivity 
growth tend to shrink regarding shares while those with higher rates of productivity growth expand. 
In this way, structural change promotes aggregate productivity growth even if we assume that 
within industries productivity growth remains stagnant. However, the empirical evidence on the role 
of structural change in aggregate productivity growth escapes broad generalisations and differs very 
much across different periods and countries or regions.   
 
So, despite the recognised importance of structural change, we can derive very little in the way of 
the importance of different sectors and industries in economic growth. The whole point of structural 
change driven by technology is that it changes boundaries of industries as well as the nature of 
industries. Hence, using high tech, as a proxy for structural change would be highly misleading as 
high-tech elements permeate many low-tech sectors. Also, catching-up countries are involved 
increasingly in high-tech industries but at low value added segments. Similar to this, the share of ICT 
industries in industry structure or export would be highly misleading as it ignores value added levels. 
So, instead of focusing on structural changes at the level of industries we prefer to focus on more 
reliable trends regarding technological changes. By this, we mean primarily technological 
diversification as reflected in changes in the structure of patenting as well as level and changes in 
subjective perceptions of demand and supply of technologies. So, we construct Herfindahl index of 
concentration to measure shifts in the patenting structure of WIPO, EPO and US patents. We also 
use subjective perceptions of buyer sophistication; of changes in buyer sophistication; of assessment 
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availability of state-of-the-art technologies as a proxy for supply as well as shifts in the availability of 
latest technologies. 
3.2.3. FIRM LEVEL ORGANISATIONAL CAPABILITIES  
Firms are the main agents of the innovation process. This structural feature of economies is ignored 
in understanding determinants of growth and technology upgrading. Usually, innovation is 
associated with new technology-based firms while the role of big business is largely ignored. The 
changing interaction between large and small businesses during development is a very much 
unexplored topic. A quite new way of looking at the role of big business in catch-up is Lee et al. 
(2013), who look at the big business as one of the binding constraints to growth, especially in 
countries that are presently in the so-called middle-income trap.  
 
Lee et al. (2013) show that the big businesses, and not SMEs, exert an independent and robust effect 
on economic growth. Wealthy countries tend to have larger numbers of big businesses than 
predicted by their sizes while many middle-income or non-members of the OECD tend to have 
negative residual numbers or a lesser number of big businesses than predicted. In overall, the 
econometric evidence suggests that a big business plays a more robust role in the economy than 
SMEs. However, they also show that the excessive relative dependence on big businesses does not 
seem to be good either.  
Overall, organisational variety in the economy does matter for technology upgrading and should be 
included in determinants of technology upgrading as one of the structural variables. This does not 
deny the importance of SMEs but suggests that SMEs alone are insufficient as drivers of technology 
upgrading. Big business plays a crucial role in structural transformation especially through diversified 
business groups, which are present in all middle-income economies (Morck et al., 2005). They are 
carriers of usually missing organisational capabilities in middle-income economies, which are an 
essential ingredient of technology upgrading (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Amsden and Hikino, 1994). 
 
This sub-component of technology upgrading is proxied by two indicators. First is the number of 
Forbes 2000 companies per million of the population, which indicate the relative share of 
organisational capabilities in the economy. A second indicator is a subjective assessment of firm-
level technology absorption. This indicator ‘picks up’ countries that do not have Forbes size firms in 
their economy but where subjective assessment of companies’ technology absorption capability can 
be used as a substitute.   
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3.3. INTERACTION WITH GLOBAL ECONOMY AND TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING 
 
A successful technology upgrading is never entirely independent process but is always linked to the 
inflow of foreign knowledge skills, which are coupled with intensive domestic technology effort 
(Radosevic, 1999). Literature that documents that are far too lengthy and only a few examples will 
suffice to reiterate this robust but often forgotten stylised fact (Mowery and Oxley, 1997; Kim, 1997; 
Amsden, 2001). The emphasis is usually on one of these two elements of catching up – either on 
domestic technology accumulation or inflows of foreign knowledge through trade, Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) and open economic regime.  
 
The literature on FDI and technology upgrading or knowledge spillovers is quite numerous. A meta-
review of this literature by Bruno and Campos (2013) shows that the effect of FDI on economic 
performance and growth are conditional. Firms, sectors or countries that are below certain 
“thresholds” (either regarding human capital, financial development or institutional quality) are less 
likely to benefit from FDI. Overall, benefits are significantly greater in low-income than in lower and 
upper middle-income countries (both at the micro and macro level). Available data provide stronger 
support for differentiating the effect of FDI on growth across levels of development rather than 
regarding geographic regions.  
 
The effects at the macro level depend on upon whether recipient countries have attained minimum 
levels of human capital, financial and institutional development. The effects of FDI using firm-level 
data tend to find that the (micro-) effect is conditional on the type of linkages (with backwards 
linkages, that is, links between the firm and its suppliers, dominating over horizontal or forward 
linkages). 
Indeed, FDI is a potential source of technology upgrading.  Integration into the global economy and 
FDI can act as important catalysts for change, but equally, FDI alone are not the driver of technology 
upgrading. As literature suggests, their effects on upgrading are highly differentiated and dependent 
on indigenous technology effort. Even when countries are integrated globally in R&D networks, they 
do not necessarily link up with domestic manufacturing value chain which leads to what Ernst (2014) 
describes using the example of Indian electronics as ‘truncation of FDI based learning’.  
 
FDI indicators are of limited value in detecting the true knowledge that is acquired through 
international industrial networks. Research on global value chains (GVC) is useful in that respect 
though it is hard to generalise. Different contributions show the positive and significant effects of 
learning through value chains on the process, product and functional upgrading up to ODM level.  
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Yoruk (2013) shows the major importance of both knowledge and production networks for firms’ 
upgrading but also that it is highly misleading to narrowing learning opportunities for upgrading to 
interactions with the global buyers within GVCs.  Her research in the case of Eastern Europe shows 
that learning by doing and learning by exporting do not have statistically significant effect on 
functional upgrading. She reveals that opportunities offered by GVCs will be of little use unless firms 
have the ability to internalise this external knowledge through its human resources, through training 
and research within the enterprise. She also shows that managerial upgrading is essential to 
technology upgrading, but global buyers do not support it. This result again highlights the 
importance of organisational capabilities or firms’ structure that we discussed under the structural 
dimension of technology upgrading.  
 
The literature suggests that this axis of technology upgrading is not similar to the former two. 
Namely, the intensity of technology upgrading axis assumes that the higher the countries’ ranking in 
specific sub-components and individual indicators, the higher the potential of the economy for 
technology upgrading and thus for long-term growth. The more developed the production, 
technology and R&D capabilities, the higher the possibility of technology-based growth of the 
economy.  Also, the more countries are diversified regarding structural features of technology 
upgrading; the higher is their potential for technology upgrading. However, the relationship 
between upgrading and structural change is non-linear, i.e. it changes at different levels of 
development. Also, technology and knowledge exchange is a complementary factor, i.e. higher 
inflows of knowledge and technology do not lead to higher technology upgrading as its ultimate 
effects will depend on interaction with other two components. 
3.3.1. TECHNOLOGY AND KNOWLEDGE EXCHANGE 
Out of the three dimensions of technology upgrading, the interaction with global economy 
dimension is probably the most difficult to capture, since technology transfer happens through 
capital equipment import, it is embedded in modes of FDI, networks and subcontracting or is 
disembodied (licences). So, modes of transfer by themselves cannot be taken as proxies of the real 
knowledge transfer that has taken place (Radosevic, 1999). Given that complexity, we consider the 
distinction between knowledge imports and exports via licences, FDI outflows and inflows and share 
of exports in complex industries. We intentionally take this very broad category of complex 
industries which includes SITCRev3 categories 5, 71-79, 87 and 88 to avoid the problem of narrow 
definitions of high technology, which ignores value added difference. We assume that export in 
these industries is on average of somewhat higher complexity than in other industry groups. 
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However, the higher share of complex industries in exports may not indicate export of technological 
knowledge in whatever form as countries may be integrated through vertical specialisation but at 
low value added segments. Also, FDI can bring knowledge and generate spillovers, but equally, it 
may lead to small or negative spillovers. Technology Balance of payment is an outcome of transfer 
pricing, and thus its positive or negative balance may often be unrelated to real flow of knowledge. 
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Technological upgrading is a flow rather than a stock concept. Hence, the major challenge is to find 
series that are long enough to depict the changing levels of technological activities and capabilities. 
Unfortunately, there is not sufficiently long data series, which would enable us to construct long-
term series of technology upgrading which could be regarded as flows. Instead, we are forced to 
measure technology upgrading index only regarding levels or stock. Luckily, unlike macroeconomic 
variables technological capabilities are changing very slowly even during periods of deep economic 
crises or high growth periods (Archibugi et al., 2009). 
 
4.1 DATA  
 
Data for individual indicators (Tables 1, 2 and 3) have been acquired from a variety of sources: World 
Bank, WEF Global Competitiveness Report, WIPO, UNESCO, UNComtrade, ISO, Thomson NSI, Forbes 
and Barro-Lee dataset at national level for 42 countries (see Appendix A for a list of selected 
countries). Relevance to the analysis, availability and comparability were the criteria used to select 
the indicators. These criteria have also determined the use of a mixture of ‘hard’ and ‘subjective’ 
indicators. Missing data accounted for less than 5% of the data. Missing values in the data set have 
been treated using several methods. Where possible, missing values were replaced with values from 
an external source, e.g. from a previous round of the same survey.7 The remaining missing values 
were treated by multiple imputation methods.8 Afterwards, the data are classified into three broad 
indexes as represented in the analytical framework (see Radosevic and Yoruk, 2016a and Tables 1, 2 
and 3). 
                                                          
7 Missing data for Belarus mostly comprised of WEFGCR indicators. Belarus has themselves conducted this 
survey asking the same questions to domestic firms. Therefore, we used their data to complement missing 
data in our database. 
8 Multiple imputation (MI) is a general approach that does not require a specification of parameterised 
likelihood for all data. The imputation of missing data is performed with a random process that reflects 
uncertainty. Imputation is done N times, to create N “complete” datasets. We have used Markov Chain Monte 
Carlo (MCMC) method. MCMC is a sequence of random variables in which the distribution of the actual 
element depends on the value of the previous one. It assumes that data are drawn from a multivariate normal 
distribution and requires assumptions that missing values are missing at random. The theory of MCMC is most 
easily understood using Bayesian methodology (OECD, 2008). 
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Table 1. Components and indicators of Technology Upgrading Intensity Index (Index A). 
Index 
A 
Component Quantitative Indicators  Source Year Comp 
weight 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
IN
TE
N
SI
TY
  O
F 
TE
C
H
N
O
LO
G
Y 
U
P
G
R
A
D
IN
G
 B
Y 
TY
P
ES
 (
D
EP
TH
) 
Production 
capability    
(Index 1) 
1.ISO9001 certificates pmi  
2.Trademark applications, resident pmi  
3.On the job training Q.5.C  
 
ISO 
WB 
WEFGCR 
2007-11 
Avg 
2012-13 
1/3 
 
0.946 
Technology 
capability    
(Index 2) 
4.Patents resident applications to national 
office pmi  
5.Patent applications to USPTO pmi 
6.Patent applications to EPO  pmi 
7.Resident's industrial design count pmi 
 
WB 
 
WIPO 
WIPO 
WIPO 
2007-11 
Avg 
1/3 
 
 R&D and 
knowledge 
intensity      
(Index 3) 
8.Business Enterprise Sector R&D 
expenditures (% of GDP) 
9.Research and development expenditure (% 
of GDP) 
10.Researchers in R&D pmi 
11.Technicians in R&D pmi 
12.Scientific and technical journal articles  
pmi 
13.Science citations  pmi 
14.The quality of scientific research 
institutions  Q.12.02   
15.University - industry collaboration in R&D 
Q.12.04 
 
UNESCO 
 
WB 
 
 
 
ThomsonNSI 
 
 
WEFGCR 
2011 
 
2011 
 
 
 
2007-11 
Avg 
 
2012-13 
1/3 
 
 
Table 2. Components and indicators of Technology Upgrading Breadth Index (Index B). 
Index 
B 
Component Quantitative Indicators  Source Year Comp 
weight 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
SC
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E 
O
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G
Y 
U
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D
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TR
U
C
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A
L 
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A
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R
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B
R
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D
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) 
Infrastructure:  
human capital 
and physical 
and 
organisational 
(Index 4) 
1.Average years of schooling 25+ 
2.Quality of maths and science education 
Q.5.04 
3.Availability of research and training services  
Q.5.07 
4.Availability of scientists and engineers  
Q.12.06 
5.Fixed broadband Internet subscribers (per 
100 people) 
6.Gross Fixed Investment as % of GDP 
Barro-
Lee 
WEFGCR 
 
 
 
 
WB 
2010 
 
2012-13 
 
 
2012 
1/3 
 
0.893 
 Structural 
change         
(Index 5) 
7.Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for total 
national patent applications 
8.Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for patent 
applications to EPO 
9.Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for patent 
applications to USPTO 
10.Buyer sophistication   Q.6.16 
11.Change in buyer sophistication( % change 
in Q. 6.16 from 2006-07 to 2012-13) 
12.Availability of state-of-the-art technologies  
Q.9.01 
13.Change in availability of latest 
technologies( % change in 9.01 from 2006-07 
to 2012-13) 
 
WIPO 
 
 
 
 
 
WEFGCR 
2007-12 
avg 
 
 
 
 
2012-13 
 
1/3 
 
Firm-level 
capabilities 
(Index 6) 
14.Number of enterprises in Forbes 2000 pmi 
15.Firm-level  technology absorption  Q.9.02 
Forbes 
WEFGCR 
2013 
2012-13 
1/3 
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Table 3. Indicators of Technology and Knowledge Exchange Index (Index C) 
Index C Quantitative Indicators  Source Year Cronbach 
is alpha 
INTERACTION 
WITH GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 
(TECHNOLOGY 
AND KNOWLEDGE 
EXCHANGE) 
1.Licensing receipts as % of GDP 
2.Licensing payments as % of GDP 
3.Share of exports in complex industries in total 
exports (SITCRev3 5 71-79 87 88)  
4.Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP) 
5.Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) 
WB 
 
UNComtrade 
 
WB 
2012 
 
2008-12 
Avg 
2007-12 
Avg 
0.827 
 
4.2 DEVELOPING MEASURES BY COMPOSITE INDEX METHODOLOGY  
 
The individual indicators in Tables 1, 2 and 3 have then been used to construct latent variables for 
the three indexes Index A, Index B and Index C by using composite index methodology.9 
 
A typical composite indicator will take the form (Freudenberg, 2003: 7): 
 
(1)       𝐼 = ∑ 𝑤𝑖X𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖=1  
where 
I: Composite index, 
Xi: Normalised variable,  
wi: Weight of the Xi,  ∑ 𝑤𝑖 
𝑛
𝑖=1 = 1 and 0 ≤ w ≤ 1 
i: 1,…, n. 
 
Equation (2) shows explicitly the normalisation method (Min-Max) used:   
(2) 𝐼𝑐 = ∑ ∑ 𝑤𝑗𝑚 {(X𝑗𝑚𝑐 − X𝑗𝑚
min) | (X𝑗𝑚
max
 
− X𝑗𝑚
min) }
𝑀
𝑚=1
𝐽
𝑗=1
 
 
where c indicates country, j and m are indicator and component subscripts and min and max denote 
the minimum and maximum values of each indicator across countries.  
Based on our analytical framework, the first index (intensity of technology upgrading) consists of 
three components: production capability, technology capability and R&D and knowledge intensity 
based on sixteen indicators. The index of the breadth of technology upgrading also contains three 
                                                          
9 Composite indexes are widely used in economic and business statistics for benchmarking the relative 
progress of countries in a variety of policy domains such as competitiveness, globalization and innovation. 
Even though Grupp and Mogee (2004) criticize the approach for its vulnerability to manipulation, Archibugi et 
al. (2009) stress that when they are used in the right perspective and within a sound theoretical framework 
they can be extremely useful tools. For instance see Radosevic and Yoruk (2011) on formation of composite 
indexes from entrepreneurship perspective. 
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components: human capital and physical infrastructure, structural change and firm-level capabilities 
based on thirteen indicators. Index C covers five manifest indicators representing knowledge inflow 
and outflow from a country.10 The sources, availability and weights for each of these indexes and 
their indicators are presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3. All indexes are estimated based on the 
normalisation11 of indicators followed by aggregation12 of components with equal weights given to 
each element. In the existing literature, there are numerous weighting methods with pros and cons. 
These vary from equal weighting to use for statistical models such as factor analysis (FA)/principal 
component analysis (PCA), or a ‘benefit of the doubt’ (BOD) approach which is sensitive to national 
priorities and weights are country specific (OECD, 2008: 32). Based on our already developed 
analytical framework, we use an equal weighting method applied on each component. OECD 
(2008:31) states that “most composite indicators rely on equal weighting, i.e. all variables have the 
same weight. This criterion essentially implies that all variables are ‘worth’ the same in the 
composite, but it could also disguise the absence of a statistical or empirical basis, e.g. when there is 
insufficient knowledge of causal relationships or a lack of consensus on the alternative. Moreover, if 
variables are grouped into components and those are further aggregated into the composite, then 
applying an equal weighting to the variables may imply an unequal weighting of the component (the 
components grouping the larger number of variables will have higher weight). This could result in an 
unbalanced structure in the composite index.” That is why we have given the same weight to each 
component as based on our analytical framework and then determined the weight of each indicator 
to achieve a balanced structure in the composite index. 
 
We also provide Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of reliability for each of the latent constructs (see 
Tables 1, 2 and 3) to further indicate the correlation between the selected indicators (Anderson and 
Gerbing, 1988). C-alpha in each case is above the 0.70 thresholds of acceptable reliability (Nunnally, 
1978). So, they are highly likely to share common factors as outlined by our analytical framework 
and it is evidence that the indicators are measuring the same underlying construct (OECD, 2008: 71–
2). We also provide the results of Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) applied to indicators for each 
                                                          
10 See Appendix B for a detailed explanation of indicators and the formation of indexes. 
11 We have used Min-Max (distance from the best and worst performers) normalization method in this 
research, since this is the most compatible method with the indicators we have chosen. 
12 Linear, geometric or multi-criteria aggregation might be applied. We opted for linear aggregation method 
where substitution along dimensions (components) is constant, which we prefer in accordance with our 
conceptual framework. It is also compatible with Min-Max method of normalization, especially when 
individual indicators are measured in different units. Technical weaknesses of the aggregation convention are 
widely discussed in Munda and Nardo (2009). 
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component separately in Appendix C. The indicators selected for the components and main indices 
merge into factor groups assuring the validity of the constructs. 
In Appendix C, we also show how well individual components of indexes covariate between item-
pairs, i.e. how well they are loading on the common factor.  For six indexes (except production 
capability) index we have very high C-alpha scores. Production capability index which consists of 
ISO9001 certificates, trademark applications per million of the population and subjective assessment 
of the on the job training has a low-reliability score of 0.458. We think that this reflects much less 
conceptual inconsistency of production capability concept but more diversity of investments in this 
capacity at countries of different income levels. 
5. ANALYSIS OF LEVELS AND PROFILES OF TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING 
Data that form the basis for this research enable quite detailed exploration of the relationship 
between specific income groups and reveal very relevant comparative insights on different 
economies. Much of these are discussed in our working paper (see Radosevic and Yoruk, 2016b) 
which form the basis for this article. In this article, mainly due to space reasons we confine the 
analysis on broad relationships between income levels and indexes of technology upgrading, with 
particular reference to middle-income economies.  
5.1 PROBING THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN ASPECTS OF TECHNOLOGY UPGRADING AND 
DIFFERENT INCOME LEVELS  
We first present results from the construction of three composite indexes underlying major aspects 
of technology upgrading for 42 selected middle and high-income economies categorised by income 
levels (Table 4). A multidimensional approach to analysis gives us the opportunity to explore profiles 
of technology upgrading and their relationships to income levels.  
Indexes of technology upgrading do not indicate speed or pace of upgrading as that would require 
long time series which are simply not available for the type indicators that are necessary for 
measuring technology upgrading. However, an index represents proxy of potential for technology 
upgrading. In that respect, a country that ranks low regarding income per capita but has high 
magnitude of indexes of technology upgrading suggest that it has real potential for growth based on 
technology upgrading.  
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Table 4.The three indexes of technology upgrading by income group and country. 
Income Group Country  
INDEX A: INTENSITY 
OF TECHNOLOGY 
UPGRADING 
 
Country  
INDEX B: BREADTH 
OF TECHNOLOGY 
UPGRADING Country  
INDEX C: INDEX OF 
INTERACTION WITH 
GLOBAL ECONOMY 
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Sweden 63.4 Sweden 77.1 Ireland 100.0 
Germany 58.7 Japan 73.2 Belgium 57.1 
Japan 57.5 Ireland 69.8 UHI AVERAGE 37.7 
Belgium 52.0 United States 68.2 Sweden 36.0 
Austria 51.1 Belgium 65.9 United Kingdom 29.1 
UHI AVERAGE 49.7 UHI AVERAGE 65.8 Austria 27.5 
United States 48.8 United Kingdom 65.6 United States 24.7 
United Kingdom 44.1 Austria 64.6 Japan 24.4 
Ireland 36.1 Germany 62.8 Germany 23.5 
Italy 35.3 Italy 44.6 Italy 17.1 
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Korea, Rep. 66.6 Korea, Rep. 67.5 Estonia 25.0 
Slovenia 35.5 Portugal 53.6 Korea, Rep. 22.3 
Spain 34.5 Spain 51.6 Spain 21.7 
Czech Republic 33.9 Estonia 50.0 Slovenia 20.4 
Portugal 31.4 Chile 49.3 Czech Republic 19.6 
Estonia 30.1 LHI AVERAGE 48.4 Chile 18.5 
LHI AVERAGE 30.0 Czech Republic 47.7 LHI AVERAGE 18.0 
Chile 21.8 Greece 46.5 Portugal 17.3 
Poland 17.7 Slovenia 42.9 Poland 17.1 
Greece 15.2 Poland 40.0 Russian Federation 11.1 
Russian Federation 13.9 Russian Federation 34.4 Greece 7.1 
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Malaysia 23.1 Malaysia 55.8 Hungary 62.6 
China 21.8 China 47.9 Jordan 25.0 
Hungary 21.3 Jordan 45.1 Bulgaria 21.2 
Turkey 18.3 South Africa 42.8 Malaysia 20.4 
Brazil 17.9 Mexico 42.2 China 19.0 
South Africa 15.4 Turkey 42.2 UMI AVERAGE 18.7 
Bulgaria 14.7 Brazil 42.1 Thailand 17.9 
UMI AVERAGE 14.2 Hungary 42.0 Mexico 17.7 
Mexico 12.9 Thailand 41.9 Turkey 15.8 
Jordan 12.1 UMI AVERAGE 38.7 Kazakhstan 15.0 
Peru 11.6 Kazakhstan 35.1 Romania 13.9 
Romania 11.4 Romania 33.3 Albania 13.1 
Thailand 11.4 Bulgaria 32.7 Belarus 12.6 
Kazakhstan 8.4 Peru 30.8 Brazil 9.8 
Belarus 6.5 Albania 29.2 South Africa 9.5 
Albania 6.4 Belarus 17.7 Peru 6.9 
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Indonesia 10.9 Ukraine 44.1 Vietnam 18.2 
India 10.7 Morocco 40.7 Ukraine 12.5 
Ukraine 10.1 India 39.9 LMI AVERAGE 10.9 
Philippines 10.1 Indonesia 37.4 Moldova 10.7 
Morocco 8.9 Philippines 36.6 Philippines 10.3 
LMI AVERAGE 8.8 LMI AVERAGE 33.3 India 9.9 
Vietnam 8.5 Moldova 25.3 Morocco 9.8 
Ghana 6.0 Vietnam 21.5 Ghana 9.1 
Moldova 5.1 Ghana 20.7 Indonesia 6.4 
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The highest ranking countries regarding index of intensity of technology upgrading are Korea, 
Sweden, Germany and Japan.  Korea has very high index given its current level of income and thus 
has excellent potential for further growth based on technology. Given its level of income, Italy has 
the modest potential for further technology upgrading. Similarly, Russia has very low potential for 
technology-based growth given its income level. Although Poland has been a fast-growing Central 
and Eastern European (CEE) economy in the last 20 years, it seems that its potential for technology-
based growth does not look so bright. Of course, Poland may grow based on its production 
capability, and on-non-technological factors for some time but it seems that drivers for technology-
based growth are far from where they should be given its recent high growth. China’s ranking 
regarding the intensity of technology upgrading is well above its income per capita, which suggests 
room for further growth based on technology. However, we should bear in mind that the majority of 
indicators are used on per capita basis, which clearly underestimate differences in the absolute size 
of economies and nonlinear effects that this may generate. For instance, the issue of absolute vs. 
relative size is striking when comparing India and Ukraine with their respective gross national 
income per capita (GNI pc) of $1550 and $3640, but with Ukraine and India being comparable 
regarding the index of technology upgrading intensity even though the majority of indicators are 
used in per capita terms.  
There are much larger differences in ranking among countries relating to the intensity of technology 
upgrading than regarding the technology upgrading breadth index capturing structural change (Fig.1 
and Table 4). The ordering of countries within specific income groups is much more regular, i.e. 
related to income per capita for the intensity of technology upgrading than for the breadth of 
upgrading. This is especially the case from upper middle-income group upwards and less for the 
lower middle-income group. This may be expected as technology, and its cumulative features play a 
much more important role in income generation the nearer is the country to the technology frontier. 
Additionally, a much stronger convergence regarding the breadth of or scope of technology 
upgrading is due to smaller differences in infrastructure but especially due to the intensive process 
of structural change, which takes place at different levels of different income groups. So, much of 
these differences regarding the breadth of technology upgrading are mainly due to remain third 
component - differences regarding firm-level organisational capabilities. It is on firm level 
organisation capabilities that we have on average the biggest differences within (not between) 
different income groups (Figure 2).  
The third component of technology upgrading is the interaction with the global economy or 
technology and knowledge exchange (Table 4 and Fig 1).  The link between income levels and the 
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index of technology and knowledge exchange is much different from those of the indexes of 
intensity and breadth of technology upgrading. This link is quite weak, both overall and within four 
income groups and with three major outliers (Ireland, Hungary and Belgium). These outliers are 
mainly due to the high share of FDI, both in inflows and outflows, and a large proportion of 
technology balance of payments and receipts, which reflect transfer pricing related to high levels of 
FDI. Still, even if we ignore the outliers the index of technology and knowledge exchange is on 
average related to income levels of income groups but not within groups. The fourth outlier is 
Greece, despite being the lower high-income economy in the 40th place regarding the index of 
technology and knowledge exchange in the sample of 42 economies. This is due in large part to the 
very low share of inward FDI and related to that a low proportion of technology payments in GDP. 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between average scores for four income groups of countries across 
three indexes (intensity and breadth of technology upgrading indexes and the index of interaction 
with global economy).  As expected, income groups are ordered in decreasing manner across all 
three indexes. However, the range of income groups is the biggest in the case of the index of 
intensity of technology upgrading (82 percentage points between low, middle income and upper 
high income) and smallest in the case of the index of the breadth of technology upgrading (49 
percentage points). The global interaction index is close to the index of intensity of technology 
upgrading (71 percentage points). These results suggest that breadth of technology upgrading is 
much more present at lower income levels while the intensity of technology upgrading is 
significantly less intensive in the lower income groups. Also, technology and knowledge exchange 
are considerably more intensive in the case of the upper high-income group, but it is much more 
compressed in the case of lower high income and upper middle-income groups.  
Figure 1. Indexes of intensity and breadth of technology upgrading and interaction with global 
economy by income groups. 
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Figure 2 shows six sub-indexes. Again, each of the sub-indexes is ranked in decreasing order as 
average income per capita of the groups fall. The biggest range is in the case of technology 
capability, where the difference between upper high income and lower middle-income groups is 
96% percentage points. The gap between upper high income and middle-income economies is 
strikingly elevated in this case, which suggests that generation of frontier technology is the domain 
of only the highest income bracket group.  Production and R&D capabilities are also quite dispersed 
with 77 and 79 percentage points’ difference. In the case of production capability, their ranking is 
quite ordered with similar distances between different income groups.  However, it is less orderly for 
R&D capability, where the middle-income group is relatively less advanced than regarding their 
production capability.  The breadth of technology upgrading is much less dispersed with a max-min 
difference for structural change being only 32 percentage points and for infrastructure 48 
percentage points. These data suggest that structural change may be of different types, but it does 
take place at various income levels creating a quite compressed distribution with small differences 
between the different income groups. Differences in infrastructure are comparatively lower, but the 
difference between two middle-income groups are quite small but significant when compared to the 
upper high-income group. Firm-level organisation capabilities are closer to the dispersion of 
production and R&D capability (69 percentage points). However, they are distinctively less 
developed in the case of lower high income and middle-income economies when compared to the 
upper top income group. They are not as pronounced as in the case of technology capabilities, but 
they are concentrated much more on upper high income than in the lower high-income group. So, 
the threshold level for firm organisational capabilities is located much higher regarding income than 
for infrastructure, R&D or production capabilities.  
Figure 2. Sub-indexes of technology upgrading by income groups. 
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Before moving onto the next section, we remind that the primary value of our contribution is not in 
the ranking of economies but a better understanding of patterns of technology upgrading. As we 
pointed out earlier, the correlation between our three indexes and other similar composite 
indicators based rankings shows a relatively high degree of correlation (Table 5). 
Table 5. Rank correlation of selected indexes. 
 Index A 
(intensity) 
Index B 
(breadth) 
Index C 
(interaction) 
Index A (intensity) (2007-2013) 1   
Index B (breadth) (2007-2013) 0.889 1  
Index C (interaction) (2007-2013) 0.7293 0.7009 1 
WEF GCR Technological Readiness index (2015-16) 0.8683 0.7915 0.7017 
WEF GCR Technological Readiness index (2010-11) 0.9066 0.8075 0.8082 
WEF GCR Technological Innovation Index (2015-16) 0.8174 0.8608 0.6669 
WEF GCR Technological Innovation Index (2010-11) 0.8538 0.8383 0.6585 
INSEAD Global innovation Index (2014) 0.9030 0.8202 0.7943 
UNIDO Competitive Industrial Performance Index (2012) 0.8224 0.7800 0.6898 
World Bank Knowledge Economy Index (2012) 0.8741 0.7851 0.7509 
Technological Capabilities Index ArCo (2000) 0.8355 0.7366 0.6672 
Note: Number of countries for all indexes is 41 out of 42 except Belarus. All correlations are statistically 
significant at the level of 0.0000. 
 
However, we also note that the degree of correlation decreases from the index of intensity of 
upgrading to the index of interaction with the global economy. The average correlation coefficients 
between indexes A, B and C and other indexes are 0.86, 0.80 and 0.72 respectively. This further 
confirms that the knowledge interaction with the global economy is not linearly related to 
technology upgrading as foreign inflows may operate either as a substitute or as complementary to 
endogenous technology upgrading.  
 
5.2 IS THERE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP? 
 
In continuation, through a series of OLS regressions we test the econometric robustness of the 
relationship between indexes and income levels. However, we add a dummy variable for different 
income groups so that we can detect what visually seems present – technology related middle-
income trap phenomenon.  From technology point of view, we define it as the inability of economies 
to accumulate technology capabilities and rate of innovation which would enable them to achieve 
high-income status. 
 
Model 1 (Table 6) shows results of a regression of index of technology upgrading intensity on income 
levels with separate dummies for each of four income groups. We are interested whether dummies 
are statistically significant. If dummies are negative, that would indicate the presence of income trap 
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for that particular group or some unspecified reason that the level of the index for that group is not 
corresponding to the income level for the whole sample.  If positive, it would indicate the group-
specific factor, which makes the income level to be higher than expected given the technology 
upgrading level of the group. Results confirm what we could visually observe. First, dummy for the 
aggregate middle-income group is significantly negative suggesting the existence of technology 
middle income trap. Dummy for the upper high-income group is also significant but positive 
suggesting a kind of top high-income bonus or level of income which does not reflect the degree of 
technology upgrading as captured by our index. This may be expected, as our index is aimed to 
measure progression from middle income to high income rather than explain differences among the 
high-income economies. Dummy variables for middle-income subgroups are negative but not 
significant, which suggest that the middle-income phenomenon is not easily detectable and is spread 
across several components of the index of technology upgrading intensity. Also, dummy for the 
lower high-income group is negative, but not significant suggesting that the phenomenon of the 
middle-income trap may also be much more dispersed across income groups and should not 
necessarily correspond to middle-income groups as defined in this paper. However, the inclusion of 
dummies in OLS shows that technology upgrading is closely correlated to income levels as R-squared 
is very high.13 It is the highest in regression with the upper high-income group, which may be 
expected given the increasing role that technology plays in growth as countries incomes rise. 
OLS regressions with the index of the breadth of technology upgrading (Model 2) present more or 
less similar story as the Model 1 regressions. However, in Model 2.5 the dummy for upper high-
income group turns out to be negative and statistically significant suggesting a bottleneck for this 
group regarding structural change issues. Dummy for upper middle-income subgroup show that 
both upper middle-income groups have statistically significant and negative dummies, which may 
indicate that the middle-income trap on structural change is more of an issue in the upper middle-
income group than in the lower middle-income group. 
OLS regression with the index of technology and knowledge exchange (Model 3) carries much less 
explanatory power as R-squared drops to much lower levels. However, in all models coefficient on 
the index is significant and dummies for aggregate middle income and upper high income are as in 
the previous model. Dummy for the middle-income group is negative suggesting that the levels of 
technology and knowledge exchange for this group are lower than would have been expected given 
the relationship. Also, dummy for the upper high-income group is positive suggesting that the level 
of knowledge exchange is greater than would have been expected given the relationship. Dummies 
                                                          
13 Results of regressions without dummies are presented in Appendix D. 
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for middle-income subgroups show that both upper and lower middle-income groups have 
statistically significant and negative dummies, which may indicate that the issue of the middle-
income trap on technology and knowledge exchange is strongly present in both groups.  Also, the 
coefficient for the dummy of the lower high-income group is positive but not significant. R-squared 
is much higher for the model with a middle-income dummy and with the upper high-income dummy, 
which again suggest that in the case of the middle-income group the gap regarding technology and 
knowledge exchange is quite significant. In other words, the issue of how these economies relate 
their technology upgrading activities to interaction with the global economy explains their lower 
than expected levels of income. 
Table 7 shows OLS results for Index A: Intensity of technology upgrading, which is composed of three 
sub-indexes of production, technology and R&D capability. Dummy for middle-income groups is 
significantly negative, and it is positive for the upper high-income group.  Dummies for other 
subgroups are negative but not significant, except for Model 5.2. Signs for an index of production 
capability dummies are the same as for the Index of the intensity of technology upgrading except for 
dummy for an upper middle-income group where the coefficient is negative and significant at 10% 
level. This suggests that middle-income production capability trap is located within the middle-
income group but more likely within the upper middle-income subgroup. In other words, given their 
production capability levels, this group records the level of income which is below expected. 
Regression with income and technology capability index shows negative and significant dummy 
coefficient for the aggregate middle-income group and lower middle-income group. So, the issue of 
‘technology capability middle-income trap’ seems to be more relevant for the lower middle-income 
group. For lower high-income group, negative and 10% level significant coefficient for production, 
capability becomes not significant but positive for technology capability. Regression for R&D 
capability generates similar results as for production capability but with two important differences. 
First, the coefficient for the middle-income group is again negative but is significant only at 5% level 
suggesting that R&D plays a major role in the absorptive capacity of middle-income economies. It 
explains why results for R&D capability are more similar to production capability than to technology 
capability. 
In Table 8, regression with Index B: Breadth of technology upgrading shows that dummy for the 
middle-income group is significant and negative. However, it is also significant and negative for the 
upper middle-income group (albeit except for index 4: human and physical infrastructure), which 
suggest that middle-income trap is more related to structural change issues in the subgroup of upper 
middle-income economies. This coefficient is positive and statistically significant only for the upper 
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high-income group dummy, but not significant and negative for the lower upper high-income group. 
Index with infrastructure proxies also shows negative and significant dummy for the middle-income 
group but without a clear indication of the location of trap between two middle-income subgroups. 
The middle-income trap here is also largely located in the upper middle-income group. Finally, 
regression with the firm level organisation capabilities shows very strong middle income trap for 
both middle-income groups though much stronger in the upper middle-income group. Also, 
dummies for both high-income groups are positive but significant only for the upper high-income 
subgroup.  
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Table 6. OLS regressions for Index A (intensity), Index B (breadth) and Index C (interaction). 
Dependent indicator: GNI per capita 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 
Index A (intensity) 662 
(0.000) 
800 
(0.000) 
805 
(0.000) 
846 
(0.000) 
493 
(0.000) 
          
Index B (breadth)      638 
(0.000) 
884 
(0.000) 
877 
(0.000) 
944 
(0.000) 
471 
(0.000) 
     
Index C (interaction)           247 
(0.01) 
381 
(0.006) 
437 
(0.001) 
491 
(0.001) 
41 
(0.611) 
                
Constant 5611 
(0.157) 
-1378 
(0.549) 
-1383 
(0.582) 
-2264 
(0.162) 
1423 
(0.294) 
-4443 
(0.483) 
-21858 
(0.000) 
-20553 
(0.000) 
-25408 
(0.000) 
23037 
(0.000) 
24901 
(0.000) 
12249 
(0.003) 
13199 
(0.001) 
6215 
(0.118) 
9449 
(0.000) 
                
Dummy MI -7716 
(0.021) 
    -12999 
(0.000) 
    -22796 
(0.000) 
    
Dummy LMI  -3181 
(0.304) 
    -5100 
(0.180) 
    -13917 
(0.016) 
   
Dummy UMI   -2092 
(0.412) 
    -5431 
(0.071) 
    -13399 
(0.003) 
  
Dummy LHI    -3629 
(0.162) 
    -724 
(0.823) 
    4475 
(0.397) 
 
Dummy UHI     19259 
(0.000) 
    -8848 
(0.020) 
    34133 
(0.000) 
                
Number of observations 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
F-test sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.83 0.93 0.81 0.73 0.74 0.72 0.88 0.69 0.35 0.40 0.26 0.80 
Adjusted R2 0.83 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.92 0.80 0.72 0.73 0.70 0.88 0.67 0.32 0.37 0.22 0.79 
Note: Values in parentheses are corresponding p values for t-test. 
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Table 7. OLS regressions for Index A (intensity) sub-categories. 
Dependent indicator: GNI per capita 
 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 
Index1: Production Capability 1467 
(0.000) 
2289 
(0.000) 
2181 
(0.000) 
2493 
(0.000) 
1189 
(0.000) 
          
Index2: Technology capability      1291 
(0.000) 
1905 
(0.000) 
1917 
(0.000) 
2096 
(0.000) 
859 
(0.000) 
     
Index3: R&D capability           1534 
(0.000) 
1861 
(0.000) 
1894 
(0.000) 
1990 
(0.000) 
1136 
(0.000) 
Constant 10521 
(0.071) 
-4278 
(0.271) 
-1583 
(0.662) 
-5144 
(0.082) 
782 
(0.665) 
21790 
(0.000) 
12436 
(0.000) 
12405 
(0.000) 
9218 
(0.000) 
8664 
(0.000) 
5152 
(0.224) 
-2077 
(0.394) 
-2512 
(0.355) 
-3228 
(0.111) 
926 
(0.514) 
                
Dummy MI -13093 
(0.003) 
    -16604 
(0.000) 
    -7948 
(0.022) 
    
Dummy LMI  -2007 
(0.651) 
    -10947 
(0.008) 
    -3740 
(0238) 
   
Dummy UMI   -5672 
(0.085) 
    -5887 
(0.103) 
    -1775 
(0.504) 
  
Dummy LHI    -6322 
(0.077) 
    1684 
(0.659) 
    -4108 
(0.125) 
 
Dummy UHI     25600 
(0.000) 
    26547 
(0.000) 
    19824 
(0.000) 
Number of observations 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
F-test sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.74 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.90 0.78 0.67 0.63 0.61 0.85 0.83 0.81 0.81 0.82 0.92 
Adjusted R2 0.72 0.65 0.68 0.68 0.89 0.77 0.65 0.61 0.59 0.85 0.82 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.92 
Note: Values in parentheses are corresponding p values for t-test. 
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Table 8. OLS regressions for Index B (breadth) sub-categories. 
Dependent indicator: GNI per capita 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 
Index4: 
Infrastructure: 
Human and 
physical  
1644 
(0.000) 
2427 
(0.000) 
2487 
(0.000) 
2725 
(0.000) 
1285 
(0.000) 
          
Index5: Structural 
change indicators 
     934 
(0.021) 
1819 
(0.001) 
1936 
(0.000) 
2212 
(0.000) 
842 
(0.003) 
     
Index6: Firm-level 
organisational 
capabilities  
          1164 
(0.000) 
1639 
(0.000) 
1647 
(0.000) 
1824 
(0.000) 
694 
(0.002) 
constant -370 
(0.963) 
-18412 
(0.001) 
-19400 
(0.002) 
-23060 
(0.000) 
-7355 
(0.032) 
11020 
(0.221) 
-15898 
(0.125) 
-16112 
(0.081) 
-25223 
(0.009) 
-5361 
(0.289) 
14176 
(0.000) 
1546 
(0.630) 
2535 
(0.450) 
-3277 
(0.294) 
4367 
(0.042) 
                
Dummy MI -13237 
(0.002) 
    -21192 
(0.000) 
    -16861 
(0.000) 
    
Dummy LMI  -6503 
(0.109) 
    -10249 
(0.069) 
    -9363 
(0.025) 
   
Dummy UMI   -3272 
(0.345) 
    -11239 
(0.008) 
    -8017 
(0.018) 
  
Dummy LHI    -4904 
(0.167) 
    -1211 
(0.805) 
    4276 
(0.253) 
 
Dummy UHI     24535 
(0.000) 
    30065 
(0.000) 
    26594 
(0.000) 
                
Number of 
observations 
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
F-test sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.74 0.69 0.68 0.69 0.88 0.68 0.42 0.47 0.37 0.84 0.81 0.66 0.67 0.63 0.84 
Adjusted R2 0.73 0.68 0.66 0.67 0.88 0.66 0.40 0.45 0.34 0.83 0.80 0.65 0.65 0.61 0.84 
Note: Values in parentheses are corresponding p values for t-test. 
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A series of OLS regressions with middle-income dummy enable us to compare coefficients on 
middle-income dummies and get a ranking of sizes of these coefficients (Table 9).  The higher the 
coefficient at a similar level of robustness (t-test) of dummy variable the higher the middle-income 
trap in that respective dimension of technology upgrading. Data below show dummy coefficients for 
middle-income group ranked in descending order of size.  
Table 9. Comparison of MI dummies across OLS regression models.  
Dummy                    MI Coef.      Std. Err.       t             P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
Index C: Technology and knowledge exchange          -22795.7      3076.517    -7.41        0.000    -29018.54   -16572.86 
Index 5: Structural change            -21192.28    3467.552    -6.11        0.000    -28206.07   -14178.49 
Index 6: Firm level organisational capabilities             -16860.6       2664.257    -6.33        0.000    -22249.57   -11471.63 
Index 2: Technology capability              -16603.51     2982.927     -5.57       0.000    -22637.05   -10569.97 
Index 4: Infrastructure: Human and capital          -13236.51     3943.269     -3.36       0.000    -21212.53   -5260.499 
Index 1: Production capability           -13093.33     4118.349     -3.18       0.003    -21423.47   -4763.179 
Index 3: R&D capability            - 7947.903    3335.741     -2.38       0.022    -14695.08   -1200.73 
 
The biggest coefficient is in regression with index C: technology and knowledge exchange 
(interaction with global economy) followed by the index of structural change. The highest coefficient 
on the middle-income dummy for the index of technology and knowledge exchange suggests that 
given the level of knowledge and technology exchange income of middle-income countries are lower 
by 22795 USD per capita. This means that middle-income economies are not benefiting from being 
engaged in global technology and knowledge exchange as much as they should when compared to 
other income groups. In a nutshell, this suggests that they should better use their existing levels of 
technology and knowledge exchange, i.e. make them complementary to their technology generation 
and absorption. 
The second biggest coefficient on a middle-income dummy is the index of structural change. Despite 
their intensive technology upgrading through structural change middle-income economies record 
levels of income lower by 21192 units when compared to other income groups. This may not be 
surprising given evidence on structural change and growth discussed earlier in the paper. 
Technology and knowledge exchange and structural change are therefore two the most significant 
dimensions of technology upgrading where the middle-income trap is visible. 
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We can label next group of variables as of medium importance regarding middle-income trap. 
Organisational firm-level capability, technology capability, infrastructure and R&D capability are 
dimensions of technology upgrading where the middle-income trap is of medium importance. 
Coefficients on middle-income dummies for these dimensions of technology upgrading are in 
between 16860 (organisational firm-level capabilities) and 13093 (production capability). Finally, the 
smallest dummy coefficient is for R&D capability which is significant only at 5% level. 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
We approached the issues of technology upgrading through a new conceptual and statistical 
framework geared towards broadly defined middle-income economies. The measurement is based 
on 35 indicators of both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ nature, and they are applied to a balanced sample of 42 
countries ranging from lower middle income to upper high income. Indicators have been selected 
based on their conceptual relevance, on their availability and relationship to income levels. We apply 
composite index methodology and check for robustness of groupings.   
Our results are tentative and exploratory rather than hypothesis testing type. They show that there 
is a robust and positive relationship between indexes of technology upgrading and income levels. 
However, the relationship between the indexes of technology upgrading and income hides the fact 
that there does not seem to be any relationship in middle-income groups. This may be expected, as 
drivers of growth are more related to technology capability as the income levels of countries 
increase.   Middle-income economies grow based on factors related to production capability and 
availability of labour and low labour costs. There seems to be a kind of threshold from middle-
income group to lower and upper high-income groups where the relationship between income level 
and technology upgrading changes dramatically into positive.  
A broadly defined middle-income trap is present in all dimensions of technology upgrading, but its 
importance varies across different aspects. The trap is highest for the index of interactions and 
knowledge exchange. Then, it seems to be higher for dimensions of the breadth of technology 
upgrading than for index of intensity of technology upgrading. Index of the intensity of technology 
upgrading reflects cumulative technology capability while the index of the breadth of technology 
upgrading refers to structural, infrastructural and organisational features of economies. These latter 
are subject to various market and system failures and are outcomes of a variety of non-technological 
factors (cf. political economy of the country). So, though structurally middle income may seem 
similar to higher income economies, this structural similarity does not convert into their income 
levels. A much stronger convergence regarding breadth of or scope of technology upgrading is due 
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to smaller differences in infrastructure but especially due to the intensive process of structural 
change which takes place at different levels of different income groups. Much of the differences 
regarding the breadth of technology upgrading are mainly due to the third component - differences 
regarding firm-level organisational capabilities which are the biggest within (not between) different 
income groups. 
Technology and knowledge exchange component of technology upgrading does not add to index in a 
cumulative manner. In other words, increased technology and knowledge exchange with the global 
economy does not necessarily increase the potential for growth based on technology. The 
relationship between Index C: interaction with the global economy, which is based on proxies of 
knowledge and technology exchanges is not robust due to several ‘outliers’ (Ireland, Belgium, 
Hungary, Greece) but also there is a much weaker relationship when compared to the other two 
indexes of technology upgrading. There is not a clear relationship between knowledge and 
technology exchange intensity and middle-income levels group based on the R-squared values of 
models.  The interaction with the global economy regarding technology and knowledge exchange is 
very much country and not income specific. A strong technology and knowledge inflow operates as a 
substitute or as a complement to own technology efforts recorded in other indexes. The highest 
coefficient on a middle-income dummy, on the other hand, is the index of technology and 
knowledge exchange. This suggests that middle-income economies are not benefiting from being 
engaged in global technology and knowledge exchange as much as they should in comparison to 
other income groups. In a nutshell, this suggests that they should better use their existing levels of 
technology and knowledge exchange, i.e. exploit their complementarities to their technology 
generation and absorption. 
In conclusion, although initially intended, we have given up of constructing an aggregate index of 
technology upgrading, which would be composed of indexes of intensity and breadth of technology 
upgrading, and interaction with the global economy. Although, statistically this is possible we do not 
consider it justifiable conceptually, empirically and from the policy perspective. Such index would 
hide than reveal three qualitatively different drivers of technology upgrading.  
We believe that our conceptual and statistical attempt to depict technological upgrading of middle-
income economies has demonstrated its relevance and analytical value. We believe that the 
conceptual approach has proven resilient and able to withstand the test of a battery of indicators 
that we have tested in the initial stage of research. The ranking of countries based on individual 
indexes of technology upgrading is quite revealing as they show potential for technology-based 
growth, which sometimes may widely differ from the recent growth figures or macroeconomics 
34 
 
forecasts. In that respect, indexes of technology upgrading may serve as a very useful complement in 
understanding long-term drivers of growth.  
As would be expected, the choice and selection of indicators will remain an issue for further work, 
but the majority of indicators has shown their relevance and link to our conceptual model. Analytical 
value of the three-pronged composite indicator of technology upgrading is quite relevant as it 
focuses metrics on dimensions of technology upgrading that matter for the growth of broadly 
defined middle-income economies. Equally, our research shows the limits of aggregate composite 
indicators and need to ground them in the consistent conceptual basis.  
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  Appendix A 
Selected countries by level of income per capita in 2013. 
Lower Middle Income 
(GNI pc Atlas method 
$1046-4125) 
Upper Middle Income 
(GNI pc Atlas method 
$4126-12745) 
Lower High Income 
(GNI pc Atlas method 
$12176-30000) 
Upper High Income 
(GNI pc Atlas method 
$30001- ) 
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Thailand 
Turkey 
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Korea 
Poland 
Portugal 
Russia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
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Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Norway 
Sweden 
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USA 
 
Appendix B Explanations for Composite Index Measures 
1. Technology upgrading intensity index (INDEX A) 
Type and intensity of technology upgrading lie in the production and technology capabilities and 
skills of enterprises and the population, investments and outputs in new knowledge creation and 
generation, and the extent of R&D activities. They are essential to technology upgrading as without 
them product and process innovations could not be developed.  
Index A is composed of three components: Production capability (Index 1), technology capability 
(Index 2) and R&D and knowledge intensity (Index 3). Accordingly:  
Index A = Index 1 + Index 2 + Index 3 
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Production capability (Index 1) intends to capture the rate of activities and output in relation to 
production activity. It is composed of three indicators:  
1. ISO9001 certificates (per million inhabitants) is taken from International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO), and an average of 2007-2011 values is used in the analysis.  
2. Trademark applications, resident (per million inhabitants) is taken from World Intellectual 
Property Organization (WIPO), and an average of 2007-2011 values is used in the analysis.  
3. On the job training is taken from World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 
(WEF GCR) Question 5.C and 2012-13 value is used in the analysis. This is a combination of 
two manifest indicators Question 5.07 Local availability of specialised training services (asks 
the question ‘In your country, how available are high quality professional training services?’) 
and Question 5.08 Extent of staff training (asks the question ‘In your country, to what extent 
companies invest in training and employee development?). 
 
Technology capability (Index 2) is built on measuring technology generation capabilities, mainly 
patents. It is composed of four indicators drawn from World Intellectual Property Organization 
(WIPO), and averages of 2007-2011 values are used in the analysis:  
 
4. Patents resident applications to national office (per million inhabitants)    
5. Patent applications to USPTO (per million inhabitants) 
6. Patent applications to EPO (per million inhabitants) 
7. Resident's industrial design count (per million inhabitants) 
 
R&D and knowledge and intensity (Index 3) intend to capture the knowledge developed by 
investments in R&D as well as the influence of capabilities embodied in people, i.e. R&D personnel, 
scientists and their publication outputs. It draws on eight indicators: 
8. Business Enterprise Sector R&D expenditures (% of GDP) is taken from UNESCO for the year 
2011.  
9. Research and development expenditure (% of GDP) is taken from World Bank for the year 
2011.  
10. Researchers in R&D (per million inhabitants) is taken from World Bank for the year 2010. 
11. Technicians in R&D (per million inhabitants) is taken from World Bank for the year 2010. 
12. Scientific and technical journal articles (per million inhabitants) is taken from World Bank, 
and an average of 2007-2011 values is used in the analysis.  
13. Science citations (per million inhabitants) is taken from Thomson National Science Indicators 
and average of 2007-2011 values is used in the analysis.  
14. The quality of scientific research institutions is taken from WEFGCR Question 12.02 for the 
year 2012-13. It is based on the question: How would you assess the quality of scientific 
research institutions in your country? [1 = very poor; 7 = the best in their field 
internationally] 
15. University - industry collaboration in R&D is taken from WEFGCR Question 12.04 for the year 
2012-13. It is based on the question: To what extent do business and universities collaborate 
on research and development (R&D) in your country? [1 = do not collaborate at all; 7 = 
collaborate extensively]  
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2. Technology upgrading breadth index (INDEX B) 
The breadth of technology upgrading lies in structural features and changes in these structural 
features. Structural features are based on the human capital, physical capital and organisational 
issues.  
 
Index B is composed of three components: Human capital, physical and organizational infrastructure 
(Index 4), structural change (Index 5) and firm-level capabilities (Index 6). Accordingly:  
Index B = Index 4 + Index 5 + Index 6 
Human capital, physical and organizational infrastructure (Index 4) is built on measuring the 
influence of capabilities embodied in people through the wider population with education, the 
respond to skills demand, the extent people exploit available infrastructural technologies and the 
level of fixed investment. Accordingly, it is composed of six manifest indicators:  
 
1. Average years of schooling for ages 25+ is taken from Barro-Lee database for the latest 
the available year 2010.  
2. The quality of maths and science education institutions is taken from WEFGCR Question 
5.04 for the year 2012-13. It is based on the question: How would you assess the quality 
of math and science education in your country’s schools? [1 = poor; 7 = excellent – 
among the best in the world] 
3. Availability of specialized research and training services is taken from WEFGCR Question 
5.07 for the year 2012-13. It is based on the question: In your country, to what extent 
are high-quality, specialized training services available? [1 = not available; 7 = widely 
available] 
4. Availability of scientists and engineers is taken from WEFGCR Question 12.06 for the 
year 2012-13. It is based on the question: To what extent are scientists and engineers 
available in your country? [1 = not at all; 7 = widely available]   
5. Fixed broadband Internet subscribers (per 100 people) is taken from World Bank for the 
year 2012. 
6. Gross Fixed Investment as % of GDP is taken from World Bank for the year 2012. 
 
Structural change (index 5) intends to capture over time changes in technology capability, demand 
structure and level of available technologies. It comprises seven indicators. The first three indicators 
use patent data from WIPO, USPTO and EPO to calculate Herfindahl-Hirschman Index. By this, we 
aim to assess the level of diversification by technology field/class in the patenting structure of the 
countries. The formula for Herfindahl-Hirschman index calculation is as below: 
𝐻 = ∑ 𝑠𝑖
2
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Where si is the share of patents of a country in a specific technology field. The index is calculated for 
each of the 42 countries based on WIPO technology classification (see Appendix E for a list of 35 
technology fields). The same method is applied to calculate Herfindahl-Hirschman index for national 
patent applications (Indicator 22), applications to EPO (Indicator 23) and applications to USPTO 
(Indicator 24).  
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7. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for total national patent applications.  
8. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for patent applications to EPO 
9. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for patent applications to USPTO 
10. Buyer sophistication is taken from WEFGCR Question 6.16 for the year 2012-13. It is 
based on the question: In your country, how do buyers make purchasing decisions? [1 = 
based solely on the lowest price; 7 = based on a sophisticated analysis of performance 
attributes]     
11. Change in buyer sophistication( % change in Q. 6.16 from 2006-07 to 2012-13) 
12. Availability of state-of-the-art technologies is taken from WEFGCR Question 9.01 for the 
year 2012-13. It is based on the question: To what extent are the latest technologies 
available in your country? [1 = not available; 7 = widely available] 
13. Change in availability of latest technologies( % change in 9.01 from 2006-07 to 2012-13) 
 
Firm-level capabilities (Index 6) has two manifest indicators: 
14. Number of firms in Forbes 2000 (per million inhabitants) 
15. Firm-level technology absorption is taken from WEFGCR Question 9.02 for the year 
2012-13. It is based on the question: To what extent do businesses in your country 
absorb new technology? [1 = not at all; 7 = aggressively absorb] 
 
 
3. Index of technology and knowledge exchange (ITKE) 
This index intends to capture the influence of global interactions of countries y which knowledge 
flows take place. We assess the impact of such interactions as complementary to technology 
upgrading. The index comprises five manifest indicators: 
 
1. Licencing receipts as % of GDP is taken from World Bank for the year 2012. 
2. Licencing payments as % of GDP is taken from World Bank for the year 2012. 
3. The share of exports in complex industries in total exports (SITCRev3 5 71-79 87 88). Data for 
this indicator have been extracted from UNComtrade for years 2008-12 average. We 
calculated the share of exports in total exports of each country, particularly in SITC Rev.3 
sectors 5 - Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.; 71 to 75 Machinery (Power generating 
machines, special industrial machinery, metalworking machinery, general industrial 
machinery, n.e.s, office machines); 76 - telecommunications equipment; 78-79 transport 
equipment (road vehicles, other transport equipment); 87-88 electrical and optical (scientific 
equipment, n..e.s., photo apparatus n.e.s., clocks). 
4. Foreign direct investment, net outflows (% of GDP) is taken from World Bank for the year 
2007-2012 average. 
5. Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP) is taken from World Bank for the year 
2007-2012 average. 
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Appendix C 
Factor analysis results. 
Index Component Quantitative Indicators  One factor 
solution 
for 
component 
(CFA) 
Cumulative 
explanation 
of Factor  
Chi2 
(sig.) 
One 
factor 
solution 
for 
index 
(CFA) 
Cumulative 
explanation 
of Factor  
Chi(2) 
(sig.) 
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) 
1. Production 
capability 
1.ISO9001 certificates pmi  
2.Trademark applications, resident pmi  
3.On the job training Q.5.C  
 
0.28 
0.55 
0.47 
- 7.94 
(0.0473) 
0.92 
0.76 
0.86 
 
0.75 
 
0.90 
0.85 
0.83 
 
0.78 
 
0.40 
 
0.60 
0.72 
0.60 
 
0.78 
0.85 
 
0.57 
 
0.69 729.90 
(0.0000) 
2.  Technology 
capability 
4.Patents resident applications to national 
office pmi  
5.Patent applications to USPTO pmi 
6.Patent applications to EPO  pmi 
7.Resident's industrial design count pmi 
 
0.83 
 
0.89 
0.71 
0.65 
0.87 97.2 
(0.0000) 
3. R&D and 
knowledge 
intensity 
8.Business Enterprise Sector R&D 
expenditures (% of GDP 
9.Research and development expenditure 
(% of GDP) 
10.Researchers in R&D pmi 
11.Technicians in R&D pmi 
12.Scientific and technical journal articles  
pmi 
13.Science citations  pmi 
14.The quality of scientific research 
institutions  Q.12.02   
15.University - industry collaboration 
Q.12.04 
 
0.87 
 
0.74 
 
0.86 
0.79 
0.94 
 
0.90 
0.85 
 
0.76 
0.86 383.24 
(0.0000) 
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4. 
Infrastructure:  
human capital 
and physical 
and 
organisational 
16.Average years of schooling 25+ 
17.Quality of maths and science education 
Q.5.04 
18.Availability of research and training 
services  Q.5.07 
19.Availability of scientists and engineers  
Q.12.06 
20.Fixed broadband Internet subscribers 
(per 100 people) 
21.Gross Fixed Investment as % of GDP 
 
0.66 
0.51 
 
0.68 
 
0.57 
 
0.89 
 
-0.38 
0.78 95.53 
(0.0000) 
0.51 
0.37 
 
0.85 
 
0.66 
 
0.82 
 
-0.37 
 
-0.59 
 
-0.41 
 
0.61 
 
-0.61 
0.80 
 
-0.49 
 
-0.53 
 
 
 
 
0.75 
0.79 
 
0.61 293.27 
(0.0000) 
5. Structural 
change 
22.Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for total 
national patent applications 
23.Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for patent 
applications to EPO 
24.Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for patent 
applications to USPTO 
25.Buyer sophistication   Q.6.16 
26.Change in buyer sophistication( % 
change in Q. 6.16 from 2006-07 to 2012-
13) 
27.Availability of state-of-the-art 
technologies  Q.9.01 
28.Change in availability of latest 
technologies( % change in 9.01 from 2006-
07 to 2012-13) 
 
0.72 
 
0.27 
 
0.81 
 
-0.53 
0.63 
 
 
-0.65 
 
0.55 
0.85 93.55 
(0.0000) 
6. Firm-level 
capabilities 
29.Number of firms in Forbes 2000 pmi 
30.Firm-level  technology absorption  
Q.9.02 
- - - 
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31.Licensing receipts as % of GDP 
32.Licensing payments as % of GDP 
33.Share of exports in complex industries 
in total exports (SITCRev3 5 71-79 87 88)  
34.Foreign direct investment, net outflows 
(% of GDP) 
35.Foreign direct investment, net inflows 
(% of GDP) 
0.86 
0.76 
0.52 
 
0.84 
 
0.63 
0.83 115.43 
(0.0000) 
   
Note: Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) is based on principal factors method in STATA. The 
commonalities are estimated using the squared multiple correlation coefficients.  
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Appendix D. 
Table. OLS regressions for indexes without level income dummies. 
 Model12a Model13a Model14a Model15a Model16a Model17a Model18a Model19a Model 20a 
Index 1 
(production 
capability) 
4666.9 
(0.000) 
        
Index 2 
(technology 
capability) 
 4200 
(0.000) 
       
Index 3  (R&D 
and knowledge 
intensity) 
  3939 
(0.000) 
      
Index A 
(Intensity) 
   1676.5 
(0.000) 
     
Index 4 
(infrastructure) 
    5058.6 
(0.000) 
    
Index 5 
(structural 
change) 
     5234.5 
(0.000) 
   
Index 6 
(organisational 
capabilities) 
      3538.6 
(0.000) 
  
Index B 
(breadth)  
       1951.5 
(0.000) 
 
Index C 
(interaction)  
        478.8 
(0.001) 
Constant -5646.4 
(0.084) 
9586.8 
(0.000) 
-4231.1 
(0.044) 
-3247.9 
(0.100) 
-21896.8 
(0.000) 
-34143.8 
(0.002) 
-2262.5 
(0.478) 
-27892.7 
(0.000) 
7531.4 
(0.041) 
          
No of 
observations 
42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 42 
F-test sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R2 0.64 0.61 0.81 0.81 0.62 0.41 0.58 0.71 0.25 
Adjusted R2 0.63 0.60 0.80 0.81 0.61 0.39 0.57 0.70 0.23 
Note: in brackets p value for t test. 
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Appendix E. 
WIPO patent technology classification. 
 
 
 
 
 1 - Electrical machinery, apparatus, energy
 2 - Audio-visual technology
 3 - Telecommunications
 4 - Digital communication
 5 - Basic communication processes
 6 - Computer technology
 7 - IT methods for management
 8 - Semiconductors
 9 - Optics
10 - Measurement
11 - Analysis of biological materials
12 - Control
13 - Medical technology
14 - Organic fine chemistry
15 - Biotechnology
16 - Pharmaceuticals
17 - Macromolecular chemistry, polymers
18 - Food chemistry
19 - Basic materials chemistry 
20 - Materials, metallurgy
21 - Surface technology, coating
22 - Micro-structural and nano-technology
23 - Chemical engineering
24 - Environmental technology
25 - Handling
26 - Machine tools
27 - Engines, pumps, turbines
28 - Textile and paper machines
29 - Other special machines
30 - Thermal processes and apparatus
31 - Mechanical elements
32 - Transport
33 - Furniture, games
34 - Other consumer goods
35 - Civil engineering
